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A Vital Oil Law for Iraqis
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Washington Post - [9/14/2007]
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Joshua Partlow's Sept. 5 article on the Iraqi oil law ["Missteps and Mistrust Mark the Push for Legislation"] mistakenly took issue with the U.S. effort to mediate among Iraqi leaders to achieve an agreement on a law to regulate the country's hydrocarbon sector.
First, the agreement within the Iraqi cabinet on the basic law in February was a major achievement. It is a requirement of the constitution. Moreover, all Iraqi factions said that an agreement on oil and gas revenue was an essential political condition for stabilizing the country. Only if all Iraqi communities knew that they would fairly benefit from these resources would they commit themselves to Iraq's new political order. The issue was fundamental to achieving a national compact.
Second, contrary to implications in the article, Kurdish leaders, including Iraqi President Jalal Talabani, endorsed the key provisions of the law governing control of resources and distribution of revenue.
Third, the law balanced federal and regional interests. It established a federal council -- with representation of the regions -- as the policymaking body for energy. It provided that revenue would go into a single national account and that regions and provinces would directly receive a share of revenue based on population.
Fourth, the article did not critically examine misplaced accusations that the oil law was designed to enable Americans to take control of these resources. Iraqi leaders themselves sought to enable international investment in this sector because they understood the inefficiency of Iraq's past statist and overcentralized policies.
The inability of the Iraqi parliament to complete this and related legislation on model oil contracts and other issues is an indication of how much is at stake and of the difficulty and importance of this legislation.
Achieving stability and prosperity will ultimately require Iraqi leaders to return to this draft law and the fundamentally sound bargain it contains.
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